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• Since 2002, there has been an unprecedented,
broad-based increase in global commodity
prices. Although this increase has had
a large economic impact on the major
industrialized commodity-exporting
economies, the resource-producing sectors
have not expanded as a share of GDP in
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and
Norway (collectively referred to as the
CX4 countries).
• This article analyzes the economy-wide
effects of the commodity-price boom by
consideringtwokeychannelsofadjustment:
a direct channel through which increasing
commodity prices reallocate productive
inputs into the commodity-producing
sectors, and an indirect channel whereby the
growth in income generated by the
commodity-price boom stimulates a broader
economic adjustment.
• Theindirectchannelhasgenerallyprovento
be relatively more important, generating
increases in spending and exchange rate
adjustment in all of the CX4 economies.
ince 2002, the world has experienced an
unprecedented increase in commodity prices.1
Oil prices have risen by over 300 per cent, met-
als prices by more than 180 per cent, and food
prices by 66 per cent (Chart 1).2 These price increases
have provided a signiﬁcant economic boost to the
major commodity-exporting countries, including
emerging markets like Chile, Russia, and the Middle
East. But some industrialized countries that are major
commodity exporters, such as Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and Norway (referred to here as the CX4)
have also been particularly well placed to take
advantage of the price increase (Table 1). For exam-
ple, in nominal terms, almost 50 per cent of Canadian
merchandise exports are commodity based, with oil
and gas, which account for about 20 per cent of total
exports, being particularly important. In the other
three economies, the shares of commodity-based
exports are even higher, ranging from 73 per cent of
exports for New Zealand to 83 per cent in Norway.
In comparison, the share of manufactured goods in
merchandise exports ranges from approximately
1. Since this article was written, the global economy entered a mild recession.
Global economic growth began to decelerate in the late summer and fall of
2008 as the problems with the U.S. subprime-mortgage market and falling
house prices spread to consumption and investment.This has also led to a
decline in commodity prices in recent months.
2. In this article, unless otherwise stated, commodity-price statistics are taken
from the International Monetary Fund’s commodity-price database, and
are measured in terms of the IMF’s Special Drawing Right (SDR). Using SDR
as the unit of account for commodity prices provides a “global” measure,
effectively removing the inﬂuence of any individual exchange rate. In particu-
lar, it largely accounts for the depreciation of the U.S. dollar, which would
otherwise inﬂate the price of commodities measured in dollar terms.
It also accounts for the strength of the currencies of the commodity-exporting
countries, which would otherwise deﬂate the global commodity price.
S30 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2008
40 per cent for Canada to just over 10 per cent for Nor-
way.3
An intriguing element of the current resource boom,
however, is that the commodity-producing sectors
in the CX4 economies have not generally increased
their share of real gross domestic product (GDP)
during the past ﬁve years. In Australia, Canada, and
New Zealand, where the extractive industries and
agriculture account for between 7 and 10 per cent of
GDP, the share of the commodity-producing sectors
fell marginally (by 1.3 per cent in Australia, 0.2 per
cent in Canada, and 0.3 per cent in New Zealand). In
Norway, where the commodity-producing sector
accounts for approximately 23 per cent of GDP, the
share in GDP declined by close to 6 per cent (Table 2).
The modest contribution to GDP of the commodity-
producing sectors raises some interesting questions:
How have these sectors adjusted to the boom and,
given that their direct contribution to GDP has been
relatively modest, what are the channels through
which economic adjustment and resource reallocation
have occurred?
This article describes the key elements of adjust-
ment within these four industrialized commodity
3. Based on 2005 United Nations Comtrade data. The composition of imports
is generally the reverse. Imports of ﬁnished manufactures account for over
50 per cent of imports in all the CX4 economies compared with commodity-































Source: International Monetary Fund commodity statistics
exporters.4 The focus of the discussion is on two
main channels through which the rise in commodity
prices operates.5 The first channel is via a direct
effect—the rise in commodity prices raises wages and
proﬁts in the commodity-producing sectors, which in
turn brings labour and capital into those sectors.
The second channel is via an indirect effect that results
from the growth in income generated by the rise in
commodity prices. This indirect effect consists of two
parts: (i) the growth in spending associated with the
increase in incomes, and (ii) an adjustment to the real
exchange rate. The second part results from the rise
in the prices of non-traded goods relative to the prices
of traded goods that occurs if some of the income
increase is spent on domestically produced, not read-
ily traded goods (such as construction or services).
This relative price change, referred to as a real appre-
ciation, can be brought about by either an appreciation
of the CX4 nominal exchange rates or by inﬂation in
4.  Dupuis and Marcil, in this issue, provide a more detailed analysis of the
Canadian case.
5.  The theoretical framework for the analysis is based on the three-sector
small open economy model as described in Corden (1984). The three sectors
are a non-traded sector, which produces goods and services (such as con-
struction) that do not typically compete on global markets, and two traded
sectors—a “booming” commodity-producing sector and a “lagging” sector
that produces tradable goods, such as manufactures. Corden uses this model
to consider the effects of a resource boom.
Table 1




Australia Canada Zealand Norway
Food, beverages, and tobacco 17 7 50 5
Wood and wood products 2 10 9 2
Metals and minerals 29 11 8 8
Coal 16 1 0 0
Petroleum 7 10 2 50
Gas 3 9 0 18
Other commodities 3 0 4 0
Commodity subtotal 75 47 73 83
Chemicals 5 7 5 3
Finished manufactures 13 39 16 11
Other 8 7 6 4
Total 100 100 100 100
Note: Columns do not sum to 100 per cent due to rounding.
Source: United Nations Comtrade database and author’s calculations31 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2008
the non-traded sectors of their economies. In either
case, the real appreciation will tend to encourage
resources to move out of the CX4 traded sectors like
manufacturing and into their non-traded sectors.
Largely because of these expenditure and real
exchange rate effects on the demand for non-traded
goods, the resource boom affects other sectors of the
economy, such as construction and manufacturing.
The direct effect of the resource boom is discussed in
the following section, followed by a discussion of the
indirect effect. The ﬁnal section of the article provides
some concluding remarks.
Direct Effects of the Resource Boom
As commodity prices have risen, so too, has the incen-
tive to reallocate resources to the commodity-produc-
ing sectors in the CX4 countries. But, as discussed in
this section, impediments to this process have limited
the speed and size of the adjustment. To facilitate
exposition, the extractive (mining and oil and gas) sec-
tor is discussed separately from the agricultural sec-
tor.6 The focus is on the response of employment
and capital expenditure, and the resulting impact on
the contributions of these sectors to CX4 GDP.
Adjustment in the extractive industries
Both Australia and Canada have abundant supplies
of energy and mineral resource deposits of varying
grades. In the extractive industries, a rise in price can
act as a signal to producers to “move through the
grades” and commence exploitation from deposits
6.  Due to the small scale of its extractive industries, New Zealand is omitted
from the discussion of the extractive sector. Norway is excluded from the dis-
cussion of agriculture because it is a net importer of food.
Table 2
Size of the Extractive and Agricultural Sectors
Australia Canada New Zealand Norway
Extractive Agriculture Extractive Agriculture Extractive Agriculture Extractive Agriculture
Share in total employment 2002 0.9 4.4 0.9 2.7 0.2 8.8 1.4 3.8
(%) 2007 1.3 3.4 1.2 2.3 0.3 7.2a 1.5 2.8
Share in total capital expenditure 2002 20.0 n/a 13.0 2.0 0.4 7.4 63.0 2.5
(%) 2007 28.0 n/a 16.8 1.3 0.4 7.2b 63.2 1.9
Share in gross domestic product (GDP) 2002 8.0 3.0 5.0 2.2 2.7 4.8 27.9 1.6
(%) 2007 7.4 2.3 4.8 2.2 2.3 4.9 21.9 1.6a
Note: a) 2006 estimate; b) 2005 estimate
Source: Employment and capital expenditure ﬁgures are from national statistical agencies and author’s calculations. GDP shares are taken from Datastream and
author’s calculations, except for Norway (World Bank)
that were not previously proﬁtable. Canada’s oil
sands are an excellent example. Extraction of oil was
not generally commercially viable at an oil price
below US$25 per barrel, but as the price rose above
this level, commercial production became proﬁtable
(National Energy Board 2004, 2006). At higher prices,
extraction of oil from subterranean deposits, which
requires the oil sands to be heated and liquefied
before the oil can be drawn to the surface, also
became feasible. Thus, as the price of oil rose from
US$10 per barrel to more than US$100, the possibility
of large-scale exploitation of low-grade oil deposits
has become possible.
In Canada, the response to the rising commodity
prices has been to invest heavily in the development
of new and existing mines (Dupuis and Marcil 2008).
The same has been true for Australia. Between 2002
and 2007, in both Australia and Canada, the average
pace of real capital-expenditure growth in the extrac-
tive sector signiﬁcantly exceeded that for the economy
as a whole (respectively, 23 per cent year-over-year
versus 13 per cent in Australia, and 10 per cent versus
8 per cent in Canada).7 In Australia, where resource
extraction accounts for more than one-quarter of econ-
omy-wide capital expenditure (Table 2), the sector
has been a major contributor to economy-wide
investment.
Generally speaking, growth in capital expenditure in
the extractive sectors has been quite well correlated
with the movement in commodity prices, albeit with a
lag of approximately one year (Chart 2). Such a lag is
7.  The numbers reported here are the average annual percentage change
starting from 2003 (with 2002 as the base) through to 2007. They cover the
same period used by Dupuis and Marcil (in this volume).32 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2008
not surprising. Mining investments are often large,
expensive, and irreversible.8 Consequently, because
mining companies are forward-looking entities, their
investment activities tend not to respond immediately
to price rises, which may be temporary. Rather, invest-
ment in new projects will only occur when there is an
expectation that prices will remain sufﬁciently high to
ensure that the cost of the initial investment can be
recovered from the stream of expected future proﬁts.
Because commodity prices are volatile, forming an
expectation of a sufﬁciently persistent increase can
take time.
In the case of new mining projects, once a decision to
invest is taken, the development of the project can be
another source of delay. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) estimates that investment gestation can be
three to ﬁve years in the minerals sector and even
longer in the oil sector (IMF 2006). These delays in
turn affect employment and output growth. Conse-
quently, although trend employment in the Canadian
and Australian extractive sectors has been well corre-
lated with prices (Chart 3), short-term ﬂuctuations
have tended to reﬂect the opening of new mining
projects. In 2003, for example, employment growth in
the Canadian extractive sector rose sharply as Shell
Canada’s $5.7 billion Athabasca Oil Sands facility
8.  In Australia, for example, the typical cost of a new mining project ranges
from A$30 million to A$5billion and averages approximately A$500 million
(Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics [ABARE] 2008).
Chart 2
Indexes of Metals and Fuel Prices and Capital
Expenditure in the Extractive Industries, 1997–2007
1997 = 100
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Source: International Monetary Fund, national statistical






















commenced operations. Similarly, employment
growth in the Australian mining sector accelerated in
2004 and 2005 as the value of newly completed mining
projects increased from A$1.6 billion in the year end-
ing October 2003 to approximately A$8 billion in each
of the two subsequent years.9 GDP growth shows a
similar pattern. In Canada, GDP growth in the Cana-
dian mining and oil and gas sector peaked at 2.8 per
cent in 2003 compared with an average rate of secto-
ral growth of 1.7 per cent between 2002 and 2007. In
Australia, there is a clear relationship between the
commencement of production at newly completed
mines and the growth rate of Australia’s extractive
sector (Chart 4).
There is also evidence that both Australia and Canada
are experiencing some challenges in meeting the
growing demand for labour in the extractive sector.
Rapid wage growth in the sector is one indication of
this. Both countries had experienced employment
growth in their extractive sectors during the 2002–05
period, but wage growth remained similar to (or even
slightly slower than) manufacturing wages in both
countries. Between 2005 and 2007, however, wages in
the extractive sector accelerated as sectoral employ-
ment grew three to four times faster than the econ-
omy-wide average in both economies, which suggests
9.  The data on completed mining projects were provided by ABARE (see
ABARE 2008 for a discussion). For each year, the period November to October
is represented.
Chart 3
Indexes of Metals and Fuel Prices and Employment


























Source: International Monetary Fund, national statistical
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that labour demand in the sector was growing even
faster than supply (Chart 5).10
An important implication of the foregoing discussion
is that the employment growth experienced by the
Australian and Canadian extractive sectors has the
potential to continue for some time as new mining
projects become operative in the years ahead. For
example, ABARE (2008) reported that the stock of
advanced mining projects was valued at A$70 billion
in the early part of 2008 (close to seven per cent of
Australia’s GDP). Similarly, capital-expenditure inten-
tions reported by Statistics Canada (2008) indicated
that investment spending in the mining and oil and
gas industries would grow signiﬁcantly during
2008.11
Unlike Australia and Canada, Norway’s extractive
sector accounts for over 20 per cent of GDP. Its oil
industry is considered mature, however, since most of
the country’s oil ﬁelds have reached their peak pro-
10.  Employment in the Australian and Canadian mining and oil and gas sec-
tors grew at 7 per cent and close to 9 per cent per year, respectively, during the
2006–07 period. In comparison, growth of economy-wide employment aver-
aged just over 2 per cent in both economies during the same period.
11.  The survey of capital-expenditure intentions indicated that investment
would grow by 4.3 per cent in the oil and gas sector and by 12 per cent in the
mining sector. Of course, the deepening of the credit crisis and a softening of
commodity prices may adversely affect realized investment in the sector in
both countries.
Chart 4
Australia: Newly Completed Mining Projects and

























Source: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
Australian Bureau of Statistics, and author’s calculations
duction capacity, and oil production has been in
steady decline since 2001.12 Norway’s gas ﬁelds are
expanding, however, and the economic effects of a
declining oil industry and growing gas industry have
somewhat offset each other. Between 2002 and 2007,
capital-expenditure growth in the extractive sector
averaged 8 per cent per year (equal to the economy-
wide average), employment growth only slightly
exceeded the economy-wide average, and wages in
the sector actually grew slower than manufacturing
wages. Thus, despite its signiﬁcant size, the mature
state of Norway’s extractive sector has limited its abil-
ity to be a driver of growth. In fact, between 2002 and
2007, the sector contracted at an average rate of
approximately two per cent per year.
Agriculture
Food prices have also risen in recent years (Chart 6),
but have behaved somewhat differently than metals
and energy prices. In particular, increases in food
prices have, on average, been smaller and more recent.
As is evident in Chart 6, prices of cereals such as
wheat and barley began to rise modestly in 2005 and
accelerated sharply upwards in 2007. Dairy prices
began to rise earlier, but also escalated in 2007 (partly
12.  Opportunities to expand production farther from existing reserves are
limited. Substantial deposits are thought to exist off Norway’s northern coast
but, to date, government policies have largely constrained exploration and
development (for a discussion, see Energy Information Administration 2006).
Chart 5
Wages and Employment in the Australian and
Canadian Extractive Sectors


































Extractive sector share of total employment (%)
Source: National statistical agencies author’s calculations34 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2008
in response to the winding down of European Union
export subsidies). Some food commodities, such as
meat (reﬂected on the chart in the prices of beef and
lamb) have remained stable, however.
At the same time, other non-food commodity prices
were also rising, and the cost of inputs such as fertiliz-
ers, fuel, and feed increased signiﬁcantly. As a result,
the ratio of farm-product prices to farm-input prices
(often referred to as the “farmers’ terms of trade”) for
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand began declining
in 2002 and 2003 and did not start rising until after
2005 for Australia, 2006 for Canada, and 2007 for New
Zealand. Thus, despite the rise in global food prices,
the farming sectors, until recently, have not been sig-
niﬁcant beneﬁciaries of the commodity-price boom.
Other factors have also inﬂuenced structural adjust-
ment within the agricultural sectors. Drought has had
an extremely detrimental impact on the Australian
farm sector over the past ﬁve years or so. Australian
wheat production, for example, contracted by close to
60 per cent in 2002, and by almost 50 per cent in 2006
and 2007 relative to 2005. Similarly, Canada’s beef
industry was affected by the incidence of bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), which effectively
closed the export markets for Canadian beef for much
of the period under examination. In addition, farm
support and supply-management policies may have
also impeded agricultural adjustment to world price
movements. In 2006, Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand provided farm support equal to 6 per cent,
23 per cent, and 1 per cent of gross farm revenue,
Chart 6
Primary Food Prices in SDR, 1997Q1–2008Q1
1997 = 100


















Source: International Monetary Fund and author’s calculations
respectively, compared with an OECD average of
29 per cent of gross farm revenue (OECD 2007).
The balance of different economic
forces operating on the
agricultural sectors has tended
to limit their expansion.
Overall, it is difﬁcult to separate the effects of rising
food prices from the combination of higher input
costs, problems with drought and disease, and gov-
ernment assistance policies. Nevertheless, the follow-
ing generalizations can be drawn. First, as with the
mining and energy sectors, the agricultural sectors are
relatively small. Second, employment growth has
been negative, with the exception of Canada, where it
was modestly positive. And lastly, the contribution to
GDP growth has also been small. Even in New Zea-
land, where agriculture accounts for 7 per cent of the
labour force and 5 per cent of GDP, and where capital
expenditure growth has been robust, the sector has
been growing more slowly than the rest of the econ-
omy. In other words, despite the strength of food
prices, the balance of different economic forces operat-
ing on the agricultural sectors has tended to limit their
expansion. Given their comparatively small size, their
contribution to overall employment and GDP growth
in the CX4 countries has been even more modest.
Broader Economic Adjustment
The relatively small size of the CX4 commodity-pro-
ducing sectors and their seemingly modest contribu-
tion to GDP growth raises the question: How can
these sectors be having such a signiﬁcant effect on the
commodity-exporting economies, as is widely per-
ceived? The answer lies with the second channel of
adjustment and the indirect-spending and exchange
rate effects. When commodities are important exports,
increases in the prices of these goods relative to imports
cause a terms-of-trade improvement, and the purchas-
ing power of GDP in international markets also rises.
This increase in real income is the catalyst for broad
adjustment in the rest of the economy. It triggers
increased spending on domestically produced goods
through several channels: (i) as inputs demanded by
the resource-producing sectors, (ii) as increased
demand from individuals whose wealth and income35 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2008
have risen because they own factors of production
speciﬁc to the resource-producing sectors (e.g., the
owners of shares in mining ﬁrms), and (iii) as
increased demand by governments, whose revenues
have risen. Since a proportion of this spending occurs
on goods and services that aren’t readily traded, it will
cause the prices of these goods to rise relative to
traded goods and, hence, a real appreciation of the
currency.13 This appreciation in turn erodes the proﬁt-
ability of the sectors that compete on international
markets (such as manufacturing), while increasing the
proﬁtability of the sectors that do not trade. This sec-
tion explores the impact of these indirect channels on
macroeconomic adjustment, particularly in the manu-
facturing and construction sectors of the CX4 econo-
mies.
Income and expenditure growth
As a result of the terms-of-trade improvement experi-
enced over recent years, the real purchasing power of
domestic production in world markets has increased
for all four of the CX4 economies. This increase in real
incomes is best measured by real gross domestic
income (GDI), which adjusts GDP to account for the
change in purchasing power from the change in the
terms of trade. GDP is a poor measure of the macro-
economic consequences of a terms-of-trade improve-
ment because although nominal GDP rises with the
terms of trade, the GDP deﬂator also increases. This
leaves real GDP mostly unchanged, even though real
value-added and real income must have increased
(Kohli 2006, 46).14 Chart 7 illustrates the cumulative
growth in real GDI relative to real GDP for the CX4
during the periods 1997–2002 and 2002–07. Note that
the trading gains associated with the terms-of-trade
improvement have contributed an additional 6–7 per
cent to real incomes in excess of GDP gains during the
past ﬁve years. The exception is Norway, where the
trading gains have been much greater.
The income gains will accrue, in the ﬁrst instance, pri-
marily to the owners of the various factors of produc-
tion in the resources sector. This includes not only
ﬁrms (via increased proﬁts) and workers (through
increases in wages), but also governments, via
increases in royalties collected from the sector and
13.  The real appreciation itself generates a reinforcing increase in demand
from the general population, which beneﬁts from a fall in the price of imports.
14.  Kohli (2006) and Macdonald (2007a, b) provide useful discussions of the
measurement of real GDI with applications to Canada; see also Duguay
(2006). For an analysis of the Australian experience, see Diewert and Law-
rence (2006).
other taxes, such as corporate and personal income
taxes. In this respect, as global commodity prices have
risen, mineral, oil, and gas resources have become
potentially important sources of government revenue.
In Norway, for example, where the oil and gas sector
consists primarily of conventional offshore oil and
gas, over 50 per cent of the gross value of oil and gas
production is channelled back to the state in one form
or another. In 2006, petroleum revenues accruing to
the government accounted for 17 per cent of GDP (up
from 10 per cent in 2002) (OECD 2007). In Australia
and Canada, the revenues generated through resource
royalties have grown slower than industry proﬁts, but
because proﬁts have been rising, tax revenues col-
lected through corporate taxation have risen consider-
ably. Compared with Norway, however, the
government revenue in Australia and Canada that is
directly attributable to the resources sector is rela-
tively small, with the sum of royalties and corporate
taxes from the sectors accounting for less than 2 per
cent of GDP in both countries (Chart 8).15
15.  Nevertheless, compared with other sectors of the economy, which do not
generate royalties and have not been as proﬁtable in recent years, the mining
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As global commodity prices have
risen, mineral, oil, and gas resources
have become potentially important
sources of government revenue.
The income gain is one of the most important drivers
of the economic adjustment that follows a terms-of-
trade shock because it directly affects expenditure,
which in turn transmits the shock through the rest of
the economy. The income gain from the terms-of-trade
improvement helps to explain the particularly strong
growth in domestic demand that has occurred in the
CX4 countries over the past ﬁve years. As Chart 9
shows, between 2002 and 2007, CX4 domestic demand
increased by approximately 30 per cent, much more
than CX4 GDP growth. Furthermore, the growth in
domestic demand was signiﬁcantly greater than that
in many other industrialized countries.16
One reason for the strength in domestic demand has
beengrowthininvestmentspending.Asillustratedby
16.  According to theory, permanent (or long-lasting) terms-of-trade shocks
are more likely to be spent than temporary shocks as households attempt to
smooth consumption.
Chart 8
Extractive Sector Proﬁts, Royalties, and Corporate


































Source: National statistical agencies and author’s calculations
Chart 10
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Chart 10, between 2002 and 2007, the share of invest-
ment in GDP rose signiﬁcantly for Australia, Canada,
and Norway (and less so for New Zealand), reﬂecting
growth in capital spending across a range of sectors.
Nevertheless, the contribution to investment growth
from the Australian, Canadian, and Norwegian
extractive sectors was disproportionately high, on
average. In this regard, there is a link to the direct
effect, since some of the terms-of-trade income gain
has accrued directly to mining companies as proﬁts,
which in turn have been used to ﬁnance the purchase
of capital equipment. To the extent that this capital
equipment is domestically produced, this investment
spending has also contributed to the expansion in
domestic demand and increased economic activity in
other sectors of these economies.
If it is spent, or ﬁnances tax cuts, the growth in gov-
ernment income is also a potential source of domestic
demand. Unlike past episodes, however, when
commodity-price booms helped to fund pro-cyclical
ﬁscal policies, governments in the CX4 countries have
taken the opportunity in recent years to improve their
balance sheets by running sizable surpluses. In partic-
ular, the restraint on spending has helped to limit the
exchange rate appreciation, which (as discussed
below) would otherwise be detrimental to manufac-
turing and other industries that compete on world
markets.17 Government outlays in the CX4 have fallen
as a share of GDP during the period of the commod-
ity-price boom compared with the ﬁve previous years
(Chart 11). In this respect, the CX4 governments have
directly offset the strength in domestic demand expe-
rienced during the 2002–07 period. In Norway, where
the government invests its oil revenues in the offshore
Government Pension Fund–Global (GPFG), the
growth in government spending reﬂects a spending
cap of 4 per cent of the real rate of return on the value
of the fund.18, 19 In Australia and Canada, although
17. See Carney (2008) for a discussion of the Canadian experience during the
previous commodity-price boom.
18. The GPFG is designed to preserve much of the wealth generated from oil
and gas extraction for future generations. In addition, by investing the funds
in foreign assets, the effects of inﬂows of oil revenue on the current account
are largely matched by an outﬂow on the capital account, leaving the overall
balance of payments in equilibrium, without the need for an exchange rate
appreciation.
19. It is not the Norwegian government’s intention that this cap be binding in
every year, but on average over a number of years. Thus, the cap was not met
prior to 2005, but has been met since.
Chart 11
Average General Government Outlays as a
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government spending has decreased as a share of
GDP, some indirect stimulus has been provided
because the increase in tax revenues earned from
higher royalties and corporate taxes on mining ﬁrms
has largely been redistributed to taxpayers. As a
result, general government revenues have not
increased but have remained constant in Australia
and have declined in Canada (Chart 12).
Real exchange rate changes and associated
adjustment
The growth in domestic demand can also be expected
to have an effect on exchange rates. In principle, if the
income transfer is spent primarily on domestic goods,
the income effect resulting from the change in the
terms of trade should cause the real exchange rate to
appreciate.20 In practice, under a ﬂoating exchange
rate system, such as that employed in the CX4 econo-
mies, the nominal exchange rate will respond quickly
to changes in commodity prices (and in the terms of
trade) in anticipation of the future consequences of
increased demand.
As shown in Chart 13, the trade-weighted real
exchange rates appreciated in all four countries,
although less so in Norway.21 Moreover, with the
exception of Norway, the CX4 currencies have gener-
ally exhibited greater strength than those of other
industrialized economies. The appreciation of Nor-
way’s exchange rate has been more muted than that of
the other CX4 economies because a signiﬁcant amount
of oil revenues are invested abroad in the GPFG.
The appreciation of the real exchange rate also tends
to partially offset the impact of the increase in domestic
demand by causing internationally traded goods and
services to fall in price (in domestic currency terms)
relative to those that are not traded. As a result, the
exchange rate appreciation tends to reduce the proﬁta-
bility of the manufacturing sector and to stimulate the
services and construction sectors, thus facilitating the
adjustment of productive resources within the econ-
omy.22, 23 The real appreciation can most easily be
accomplished with an appreciation of a ﬂexible
20. The transmission of a terms-of-trade shock might also affect the exchange
rate via capital ﬂows.
21. A variety of other factors have affected exchange rates during this period,
including a weakening of the U.S. dollar against other currencies in response
to its large current account deﬁcit. Nevertheless, the currencies of commodity
exporters have generally exhibited greater strength than those of commodity-
importing economies.
22. The exchange rate effect also partially offsets the direct effect of the global
increase in commodity prices.
exchange rate; otherwise, the real appreciation would
have to take place via higher inflation. As
is well documented elsewhere, a lack of nominal
exchange rate adjustment is widely accepted as a
reason for the high inflation that coincided with,
and followed, earlier resource booms.24, 25
In each of the CX4 economies, the non-traded con-
struction and utilities sectors (labelled as “other” on
Charts 14 and 15), have grown dramatically between
2002 and 2007 while, with the possible exception of
23.  The decline in the manufacturing sector due to the real exchange rate
appreciation is sometimes referred to as “Dutch Disease” (as in Corden 1984,
for example). Some authors have argued that Dutch Disease can lead to a
lower rate of economic growth and possibly a lower level of welfare. Such a
possibility could arise if ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector experience learn-
ing-by-doing, and thereby generate improvements in technology that spill
over to other ﬁrms in the sector (see, for example, Krugman 1987; and Sachs
and Warner 1995). However, the mining sector may also be a source of learn-
ing-by-doing, and it is unclear to what extent, if at all, the decline in manufac-
turing that a commodity boom induces will reduce long-run growth.
24. See, for example, Schembri (2008) for a discussion of Canada’s experience
with ﬂexible exchange rates following the Korean War resource boom. Carney
(2008) and Stevens (2008) provide a discussion of past Canadian and Austral-
ian experiences and the beneﬁts of exchange rate ﬂexibility under the current
circumstances.
25.  The beneﬁts of a ﬂexible exchange rate have been widely discussed.
Friedman’s 1953 article is the seminal contribution.
Chart 13
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Norway, the performance of the (relatively more
traded) manufacturing sector has remained weak. In
particular, employment growth in construction
greatly outstripped that in the manufacturing sector,
which was negative across all four economies. The
strong performance of the construction sector in these
economies is partly owing to the expansion of the
mining and energy sectors, but is also a result of the
income effects, which are feeding back through strong
residential and commercial property investment.
In each of the CX4 economies, the
non-traded construction and utilities
sectors grew dramatically between
2002 and 2007.
The data also indicate that, since 2002, manufacturing
in Australia and Norway has performed better than
might have been expected (generally showing a
slower rate of employment decline and, in Norway,
strongeroutputgrowth,thanbefore).Oneexplanation
is that the manufacturing sectors in these countries
have directly benefited from the increase in investment
spending, perhaps because the manufacturing sector
is partly integrated with the mining sector. In Norway,
for example, where the manufacturing sector has per-
formed especially well during the boom, a survey of
Norwegian enterprises found that about one-quarter
(27 per cent) of surveyed enterprises supplied the oil
industry (Solheim 2008). In Australia, seven per cent
of manufacturing ﬁrms cited the strength of the min-
ing sector during 2007 as a factor contributing posi-
tively to their own production growth.26 Similarly, in
New Zealand, between 2002 and 2007, the meat and
dairy-processing sectors accounted for one-third of
the expansion in manufacturing output. In the speciﬁc
case of Norway, it is also likely that limited apprecia-
tion of the Norwegian krone (which could be due to
the investment of oil revenues in the GPFG) may have
contributed to the relatively strong performance of the
sector.27
Canada has had a somewhat different experience than
the rest of the CX4. Manufacturing growth in the pre-
boom period was much stronger than it was for the
other countries, and it has been weaker during the
26.  Australian Industry Group and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Survey of Aus-
tralian Manufacturing, June 2007
27.  In addition, ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector may have also beneﬁted
from lower costs of imported inputs and investment goods.
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boom period. This could reﬂect several factors, such
as the appreciation of the exchange rate, which are
discussed by Dupuis and Marcil in this volume.
Conclusion
The direct adjustment of the resources sectors in Aus-
tralia, Canada, New Zealand, and Norway (collec-
tively known as the CX4) to the rise in commodity
prices has been small relative to the size of their
respective economies, and they tend to lag price
movements. In addition, output and employment in
the resources sectors, which tend to increase sharply
when new projects ﬁnally commence production,
have not adjusted to the resource boom as smoothly as
has investment. Given the large stock of new projects
under development in Australia and Canada and the
long lags involved, the prospects exist for the
resources sectors in these countries to continue to act
as a source of employment and output growth for
some time. In Norway, the mature state of the oil sec-
tor limits the scope for further development.
In agriculture, adjustment has also been modest
because not all food prices have shown strong rises
and, for those that have risen, the increase has gener-
ally been more recent than that for metals and energy
prices. Moreover, the combination of rising feed and
fertilizer prices and the inﬂuences of disease and
drought have also had a signiﬁcant impact on the
industry, somewhat diluting the beneﬁcial impact of
rising food prices.
On the other hand, the indirect effects of the commod-
ity-price increase have been more dramatic and have
helped to transmit the adjustment to other sectors of
the CX4 economies. With the exception of Norway,
where the process of investing oil revenues abroad has
limited the exchange rate appreciation, the increases
in domestic demand help to explain the relatively
large exchange rate appreciations and the associated
impact on the construction and manufacturing sectors
that have taken place.
Unlike past commodity cycles, the current rise in com-
modity prices is likely to be more persistent because it
reﬂects an unprecedented structural change in the glo-
bal economy. The opening up and integration of
China, and increasingly India, which together account
for almost 40 per cent of the world’s population, are
causing a fundamental change in primary commodity
demand (Francis 2007; Francis and Winters 2008).
While the process could slow, it is highly unlikely that
it will be fully reversed.
Chart 15
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